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Close the deals See IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF DOOLY COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA
Close the deals See IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF DOOLY COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA
Say something interesting about your business here. Weldon -vs.- State,247 Ga.App.17,19(1),543S.E.2d56(2000);Weldon -vs.-State,262Ga.App.782,586S.E.2d452(2003);Weldon-vs.-State,202Ga.App.51,413S.E.2d229(1991);Civil Actions Ronnie Weldon-vs.-Frank K. Martin And John H. Land, CIVIL ACTION NO.87-62-COL;Weldon-vs.-Johnston,et al,4:00-CV-0004
Say something interesting about your business here. Weldon -vs.- State,247 Ga.App.17,19(1),543S.E.2d56(2000);Weldon -vs.-State,262Ga.App.782,586S.E.2d452(2003);Weldon-vs.-State,202Ga.App.51,413S.E.2d229(1991);Civil Actions Ronnie Weldon-vs.-Frank K. Martin And John H. Land, CIVIL ACTION NO.87-62-COL;Weldon-vs.-Johnston,et al,4:00-CV-00042-HL. Filed 03/14/00 Closed 05/04/00;Weldon-vs.-Johnston,et al, 4:01-CV-00119-HL .Filed 08/27/01 Closed 09/20/01;Weldon-vs.-Bass,4:02-CV-00033-CDL. Filed 03/07/02 Closed 04/03/02; Weldon-vs.-Siddall, et al,4:05-CV-00117-CDL. Filed 12/21/05 Closed 11/28/05;Weldon-vs.-Burden,4:93-CV-00042-HL .Filed 03/24/93 Closed 05/26/93; Weldon-vs.-Hodge,4:98-CV-00090-HL. Filed 05/12/98 Closed 02/12/99; IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF DOOLY COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA Ronnie Weldon -vs.- Brenda Murrell, HABEAS CORPUS CASE NUMBER 02DV-0156 (2003) ;Ronnie Weldon v. Brenda Murrell. Filed: April 13,2007 as (4:2007-CV-00044-CDL)
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Close the deals See IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF DOOLY COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA
Close the deals See IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF DOOLY COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA
Close the deals See IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF DOOLY COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA
Sep. 3',2002. 16:33 Immediately Release.
STATE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES RESCISSION OF ORDER OF REVOCATION. RONNIE WELDON .
WHEREAS: RONNIE WELDON violated the following conditions of his parole:#2 by committing the offense of sale of Controlled Substances; Possession of cocaine with intent to Distribute on or about
Sep. 3',2002. 16:33 Immediately Release.
STATE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES RESCISSION OF ORDER OF REVOCATION. RONNIE WELDON .
WHEREAS: RONNIE WELDON violated the following conditions of his parole:#2 by committing the offense of sale of Controlled Substances; Possession of cocaine with intent to Distribute on or about May 2, 1997 and May 30, 1997 in Muscogee County, Georgia as evidenced by his conviction on April 16, 1998 in Muscogee County Superior Court .
WHEREAS: On April 22, 1998 the Board revoked the parole of Ronnie Weldon on the above violations under the provision of O.C.G.A.42-9-51 ; and
WHEREAS: On November 28, 2000, the Court of Appeals overturned the above conviction. This remained unknown until a Department of Corrections memo was received on May 24,2002.
THEREFORE: The Order of Revocation issued in the case of Ronnie Weldon is hereby rescinded and nullified and effective this date.
FURTHER: The Board directs that copies of this order be forwarded to the Commissioner of Corrections, the Clerk of Muscogee County Superior Court, and to said Ronnie Weldon.
GIVEN UNDER THE HAND AND SEAL of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles this 4th day of September 2002. STATE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES. SEAL RECEIVED AUG. 30, 2002 ADMISSIONS For the Board W.C. Davis.
See IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF DOOLY COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA. WELDON VS. MURRELL, CIVIL ACTION NO. 02DV-0156.
STATEMENT OF FACT. Ground One: Petitioner's was "denied Due Process and Equal Protection Of the Law " and is now being "falsely imprisonment due to the malicious prosecution during his trial " and " the trial court and district attorney has refused to acknowledge the legality of the Appellate Court's authority by ignoring the Court remittitur and ruling ordering a new trial. "
STATEMENT OF FACT. Ground Two: Petitioner's was denied Due Process and Equal Protection Of the Law by the State Court's 'knowingly and intentionally ' allowing an Unconstitutional and void convictions go uncorrected for the deliberate purpose of illegally detaining him " and that the Georgia Department of Corrections Computer's are still showing and computing that the Petitioner's 1998 trial convictions are in facts valid. Which also showing a tentative parole date of 05/01/2007 and the Maximum Release Date 05/29/2042." Relief Sought. Petitioner's sought in the proceedings for immediate release from confinement due to him being helded upon an illegal and void convictions per se . Filed July 25th, 2002.
See also Weldon v. STATE, 262 Ga. App. 782, 586 S.E. 2d. 452 (2003). After receipt of the remittitur in December 2000 by letter of May 23, 2002,the Department of Corrections notified the Muscogee County sheriff, Clerk of Superior Court and District Attorney that, although Weldon's 1998 conviction had been reversed, the Department of Corrections was retaining custody of Weldon due to other sentences he had received in Muscogee County. Weldon was released from the Department of Corrections 'custody on September 4, 2002 . He was returned to Muscogee County and his case was called for trial on November 11, 2002. Weldon also contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for discharge and acquittal based on his constitutional rights to a speedy trial (A) Length of Delay. Weldon contended and the trial court agreed that the 23-month delay between receipt of the remittitur and the call of his case for trial on November 11, 2002, was presumptively prejudicial and required inquiry into the other factors. See Coney v. State, 259 Ga. App. 525,526,578 S.E.2d 193(2003).(b) Reason for Delay. Here. Weldon was in the custody of the Department of Corrections serving other sentences during a large portion of the delay. The trial court concluded that he was in the State's custody, but noted that nothing indicated that the State intentionally dragged its feet in an effort to impair Weldon's defense. " therefore, although the delay attributable to the State is a negative factor , it is relatively benign [Cit.]" Johnson, supra at 418 (2). Coney, supra at 526 . (c) Defendant's Assertion of His Right to Speedy Trial. Although not sufficient to invoke the provisions of the O.C.G.A .17-7-170 ,the trial court treated Weldon's pro se demand as the timely assertion of his right to a speedy trial under constitutional provisions. (d) Prejudice to Defendant evaluating the final factor from Barker v. Wing --prejudice to the defendant--,...we consider [***8] three interests which the speedy trial right is designed to protect: preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimizing anxiety and concern of the defendant, and ,most importantly, limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. (Cit.) Nellows v. State, 274 Ga.[179]at 181,549 S.E.2d 381 (2001). Williams v. State,ssupra at 293. (i) Oppressive Pretrial Incarceration. As discussed above, all but a couple of months of the time Weldon was incarceration before trial on these charges was attributable to service of other sentences in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Weldon has not shown any specific evidence of prejudice regarding this factor. (ii) Anxiety and Concern of Defendant. No evidence was presented below regarding this factor. (iii) Impairment of Defense. " As to the matter of prejudice , we [HN5] weigh this factor most heavily in determining whether a defendant's constitutional rights have been violated. [Cit.]" Kerrigan v. State, 239 Ga.App. 65,67,517 S.E.2d 370 (1999) .n3 Here, Weldon presented no evidence that any of his witnesses who testified at the first trial were [***9] unavailable, only that memories might deteriorate. The only evidence of prejudice was the fact that the confidential informant, the primary witness against Weldon, was not available. This is insufficient. Callaway v. State, 258 Ga.App. at 123.---Footnotes123.---Footnotes--- n3 As noted in Callaway v. State, 258 Ga.App. at 119-120, any consideration of prejudice made pretrial, as here, is " at best speculative. " This is particularly true because " it has been recognized that 'delay ' is a very real defense strategy. " (Footnote omitted. ) Id. at 120. ----End Footnotes---- [*786] Balancing the factors required by Barker v. WingoWingo, we find no manifest abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that the State did not violate Weldon's federal and State constitutional rights to a speedy trial . There was no error. Judgment affirmed, Barnes and Adams, JJ., concur.
See Georgia Court Rules And Procedure 2004. Uniform Superior Court Rule. Rule 35. Post - Sentence Information. 35.1 Notification to Department of Corrections. As soon as practical after the imposition of the sentence or modification of an earlier disposition, the Clerk shall notify the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections of the sentence, and shall mail to such department the documentation required by law. Disposition reports shall be forwarded to the Georgia Crime Information Center (GCIC) not more than 30 days after disposition decisions. Amended effective March 9, 1998.
See also Tift v. State,1133 Ga.App.466,211 S.E.2d 411 (1974). The instant appeal is from an order of Revocation of probation under a prior sentence imposed upon appellant in 1971 following conviction for the offenses of burglary and theft by taking. This revocation was based upon defendant's having been found guilty of the offense of violation of the Georgia Drug Abuse Control Act by possession of less than one ounce of marijuana rendered May 31, 1974. The latter conviction was appealed to this court which has this day reversed that conviction. Tift v. State,113 Ga.App.4Ga.App.455 .Such reversal requires us to sustain the instant appeal. See Hall v. State,131 Ga.App. 786,206 S.E. 2d 644 (1974). In the case sub judice, (a) the length of delay from the issuance of the [***2] arrest warrant in Muscogee County in January, 1971 (at which time the City of Columbus Police Department had notice that the defendant was serving a sentence in Dougherty County) and the trial on November 21, 1973,was approximately 34 months, or almost 3 years. As to (b) the reason for the delay ,the district attorney testified that, although the police department knew about the case, no file had ever been turned over to his office for prosecution; yet he admitted that "perhaps we have no good reason, " and there was evidence that the defendant's October 19, 1971 motion for speedy trial was served on the district attorney, remaining in his files until June, 1973 , and that, ever since the issuance of the arrest warrant, both City of Columbus and Muscogee County officials has seen the defendant in the various areas (all within the state) in which he had been held in continuance confinement . Regarding (c) the defendant's assertion of his right, Such assertion was certainly shown by his October 19, 1971 filing of a motion for a speedy trial, as well as by his wife's written request to the Governor for an early disposition of his case. In assessing (d) prejudice to the defendant [***3], the Supreme Court has identified three interests which the speedy-trial right was designed to protect: " (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration;(ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. " Barker v. Wingo, supra,p.532. Barker points out that, while defendants sometimes benefit from a delay in the trial, society seldom does. See pp.519-521. Accordingly, the judicial determination having been made hereinabove that the accused's Sixth Amendment due process rights were violated by the deprivation of a speedy trial, the denial of the defendant's special plea in bar to dismiss the indictment, must be reversed. Judgment reversed. See also State v. Collins, 201 Ga.App. 500,411 S.E.2d. 546 (1991). The State appeals from the superior court's grant of defendant Collins' motion to acquit . Held: Defendant , who was already on parole, was arrested on the charges at issue in June 1989. He was held in the Walker County jail until September 1989 and thereafter has been incarcerated in the Georgia State Penitentiary System. No hold or detainer was placed against the defendant in the State Penitentiary by the prosecution. On November 9, 1989 , defendant was charged by indictment with having committed the offenses of criminal attempt to commit kidnapping, burglary, criminal attempt to commit interference with custody, and simple battery. Pursuant to O.C.G.A. 17-7-170, defendant filed his demand for trial. The demand for trial was filed on December 7, 1989 ,while qualified jurors were impaneled in the November 1989 term of the Superior Court of Walker County. Qualified jurors were impaneled in a subsequent term of court. Defendant, who took no action to interfere with his case being brought before a jury, was not tried during the two completed terms following his demand for trial. The issue as phrased by the State is " whether an inmate incarcerated on an unrelated offense in a State Prison, who has never been arraigned, may file a demand for trial that will entitle him to a discharge if not tried in two terms pursuant to O.C.G.A. Section 17-7-170." An affirmative answer is clearly required. First, we note that since no detainer was filed against defendant, O.C.G.A. 42-6-3 is inapplicable to the case sub judice. We are concerned solely with the application of O.C.G.A. 17-7-170 to the facts of the case sub judice. The State contends defendant has not complied with the requirements of O.C.G.A. 17-7-170 since he was not physically present and ready for trial during both terms of court following his demand. This presents an interesting issue as to whether such a requirement exists in relation to O.C.G.A . 17-7-170. O.C.G.A. 17-7-171 (b), a similar statute applicable to capital offenses but not to the case sub judice, explicitly requires that at both terms " that the defendant was present in court announcing ready for trial and requesting a trial on the indictment. " Such language does not appear in the provisions of O.C.G.A. 17-7-170. This Court has held that the above language from O.C.G.A. 17-7-171 (b) applies only to capital offenses and that there is no similar provision applicable to cases governed by O.C.G.A. 17-7-170. Ciprotti v. State, 190 Ga. App. 639,641 (4),379 S.E.2d 802. See also State v. Crapse,173 Ga. App. 100,102 (3),325 S.E.2d 620 ( overturned on other grounds , Hubbard v. State,176 Ga.App.622,623 (1),337 S.E.2d 60) and Hunt v. State,147Ga.App.787,788,250 S.E.2d 517. "*501 On the other hand, there also are cases which require the physical presence of a defendant in the trial court in order to pursue a demand under O.C.G.A .17-7-170. Daniels v. State,199 Ga.App.400 ,405 S.E. 2d 88; Luke v. State,180 Ga. Ga.App.378,379,349 S.E.2d 391; Smith v. State,169 Ga.App.251 , 253 (2),312 S.E.2d 375; Hendricks v. State,108 Ga.App. 259 (1),132 S.E.2S.E.2d 845. In our view, the correct line of cases recognizes a difference in the language of the statutes and does not attempt to graft the physical presence requirement of O.C.G.A 17-7-171 (b) onto O.C.G.A. 17-7-170. O.C.G.A. 17-7-170 is satisfied if a defendant is available for trial, whether physically present in court or not. Hendricks and its progeny,including Smith, Luke and Daniels, are overruled to the extent they conflict with our holding in the case sub judice . Nonetheless, we note that the decision in Luke would not have been different under our reasoning since that defendant, being incarcerated by a different sovereign , was not available for trial since there is no inherent authority in a court of this State to compel his presence under those circumstances. See Hunt,in contrast to Luke and Hunt, in the case sub judice, the superior court had authority to compel defendant's presence for trial, therefore O.C.G.A. 17-7-170 was fully satisfied since defendant was available for trial. Flagg v. State,11Ga.App.37,38 (2),39 (4),74 S.E.2d 562. The superior court did not err in granting defendant's motion to acquit. Judgment affirmed, Sognier, C.J., Carley, P.J., CoopeCooper,J., and Judge Arnold Shulman concur. Birdsong,P.JP.J., See Gosline v. State, 341 Ga.App. 708,802 S.E.2d 275 (2017). Gosline acknowledges that he was incarcerated in Michigan when he filed his statutory demand for speedy trial and during the next term of court. He insists, however, that he is entitled to discharge because he would have waived his right to be present at trial if the court had set his trial on its calendar. We disagree. Compare Reid v. STATE, 116 Ga.App. 640,647-648(2),158 S.E.2d 461 (1967) defendant who was in the custody of the Georgia State Board of Corrections on a previous conviction was entitled to a discharge of his pending charges when he was not brought to trial within two terms of his demand for speedy trial. Gasoline also contends that McIver v. State, 205 Ga. App. 648, is inconsistent with the principal that once a defendant files a proper demand for speedy trial, he is not required to take any further action to be automatically entitled to a discharge if the two - term deadline passes without trial . See, e.ge.g., State v. Marshall, 337 Ga.App. 336,337-338 (1),787 S.E.2d 290 (2016).Even the cases reciting this principal, however, have recognized that a defendant must be available for trial to invoke the two-term deadline. For example, in Flagg v. State,supra , 11 Ga.App. 37,74 S.E.2d 562 (1912),the defendant filed a demand for speedy trial on his felony indictment. We concluded that he was available for trial, and was therefore entitled to a discharge based on the passage of two terms, even though he was serving a chain-gang sentence for a previous conviction. Central to our conclusion was the fact that both the pending felony indictment and the previous conviction were before the same trial court, so the state had the defendant in its custody and could produce him for trial. I'd. at 41. See also Street v. State, 211 Ga.App. 230,438 S.E.2d 693 (1993). William J. Mason, for appellant. Douglas C. Pullen,District Attorney, Bradford R. Pierce,Assistant District Attorney for appellant. JOHNSON,Judge.
This is a direct appeal from the trial court's denial of Street's motion for discharge and acquittal made on the ground that the State had failed to try him within the time prescribed by statute after he *231 filed a demand for trial. See Hubbard v. State, 254 Ga. 694(333 S.E.2d 827)(1985);Compare Smith v. State, 207 Ga.App. 762(429 S.E.2d 149)(1993). Street was indicated on March 9,1993,for the offenses of burglary, first degree forgery and theft by taking. After he failed to appear at arraignment on March 19, 1993, the State learned that Street was incarcerated at the Lowndes County Correctional Institute. The trial court entered an order dated March 23, 1993, directing the Department of Offender Rehabilitation to produce Street for arraignment on June 4,1993, and for trial on June and for trial on June 14, 1993.On March 26, 1993, Street forwarded a demand for speedy trial to the Superior Court of Muscogee County and served a copy on the district attorney's office by U.S. mail. A copy of the demand, bearing a stamp indicating it was filed on March 30, 1993,is included in the record on appeal. It is undisputed that the case was not tried during the February or April terms of court. The State acknowledges in its brief that "for some unexplained reason... The Department of Corrections did not produce [Street] for the scheduled arraignment and trial. " On June 8, 1993, Street filed a motion for discharge and acquittal. At a hearing on the motion, the trial judge found that the court's March 23 order substantially compiled with the definition of a detainer. Therefore, it concluded, Street should have followed the procedure outlined in O.C.G.A. 42-6-3 for ensuring a trial date and his demand for speedy trial pursuant to O.C.G.A 17-7-170 was ineffective .
A detainer is " a written instrument executed by the prosecuting officer of a court and filed with the department requesting that the department retain custody of an inmate pending delivery of the inmate to the proper authorities to stand trial upon a pending indictment or accusation..." (Emphasis supplied.) O.C.G.A. 42-6-1 (3). Detainer statutes are in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed.[1] This court has not been called upon to interpret this particular section of the statute. However, the Attorney General has opined that officers and employees of a county probation department are not prosecuting officers of a court within the meaning of the Georgia Detainer Act. Op. Atty. Gen. 69-268. The order in this case was issued by the trial judge, and not by the prosecuting officer in the case. Therefore it cannot be considered a detainer pursuant to O.C.G.A..42-6-1 et seq., and Street was not required to follow the procedures outlined in O.C.G.A. 42-6-3 to obtain a final disposition of subsequent charges within two terms of court. *232 The State argues that even if the detainer statutes do not apply, Street is not entitled to acquittal because there was not strict compliance with the three-prong requirement recently reiterated in State v. Moore, 207 Ga.App. 677,428 S.E.2d 815(1993). In Moore, the appellant was charges with armed robbery, a capital crime. The Moore case examines the requirements of O.C.G.A. 17-7-171 (b) which are inapplicable to this case because Street was indiindicted for burglary, first degree forgery and theft by taking, all felonies, but none are crimes for which he could receive the death penalty. See generally White v. State, 202 Ga.App. 370,414 S.E.2d 296(1991) . Street's demand for speedy trial was timely filed [2] and unequivocal in meaning. Green v. State, 191 Ga.App. 873,875,383 S.E.2d 359(1989). His motion for discharge and acquittal should have been granted. Judgment reversed. McMurray,P.J.,and Blackburn,J.,concur., NOTES [1] For a comprehensive discussion of history of development of O.C.G.A. 17-7-170 and how it interfaces with detainer statutes, see State v. Collins, 201 Ga.App. 500,501-506,411 S.E.2d 546(1991). [2] That Street had not been arraigned at the time his speedy trial demand was filed did not toll the time within which his case should have been tried. See Smith v. State, supsupra, in which this court noted:"[I]f a speedy trial demand is timely entered, the State must act to arraign and try the defendant within the allotted time or else he is entitled to discharge and acquittal. " Id. At 763.
See also IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MUSCOGEE COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA. STATE OF GEORGIA VS. RONNIE WELDON, SU 97 CR 2956 Filed AUG.21, 2002. MOTION FOR DISCHARGE AND ACQUITTAL PURSUANT TO O.C.G.A 17-7-170. Page's 10-18 Paragraphs 56-91.
REMITTITUR.
56. The Court of Appeals transmitted the remittitur on December 12, 2000 ,and filed with the clerk below in the Office of Clerk of The Superior Court of Muscogee County, Columbus, Ga.
DOCKETING CASES RETURNED BY APPELLATE COURT.
57. The Court of Appeals of Georgia transferred their remittitur and order with the holding and constitutionally of O.C.G.A. 5-5-49 (a) & (b).
(a) A case decided by the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals which is not finally disposed of by the decision shall stand for further hearing at the term next ensuing after the decision by the Appellate Court unless the Lower Court is in session when the decision is made, in which event it shall stand for trial during such terms of the Lower Court.
(b) The Clerk of the Lower Court, upon receipt of the remittitur of the Appellate Court, shall docket the case for trial in accordance with subsection (a) of the Code Section.
(c) The judge presiding may in his discretion postpone the hearing of any such case to a day in the terms as to him may seem reasonable; or,if necessary to give proper time for preparation , he may continue the case until the next term of the Court.
58. The Superior Court of Muscogee County, Terms of Court on every first Monday of February, April, June, August, October and December.
59. The Trial Court received the remittitur from the Appellate Court during the December term's of Court in 2000.
THE MISHANDLING OF REMITTITUR BEING PROPERLY FILED IN THE TRIAL COURT.
60. The new trial... was granted upon the remittitur of this court being made the order of the Lower Court . ' In point of fact, the new trial was granted when the Appellate Court so ordered, and the Trial Court's duty was to effectuate the Appellate judgment upon the filing with the Clerk of the Lower Court of the Remittitur ordering the New Trial.
61. The decision of the Appellate Court and any direction in the case shall be certified by the Clerk to the Court Below... The decision and direction shall be respected and carried into full effect in good faith by the court below.
62. Pursuant to O.C.G.A. 17-8-34 . When a case is sent back for trial to a [ lower ] court by the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, the case shall be in order for trial. Thereupon, the filing of the remittitur in the Lower Court should be the point in time at which the demand clock should resume ticking, Infra.
63. The Clerk of the Lower Court's Intentionally or Negligently to enter the return of the remittitur on the minute of the court. See Paragraphs (57),(58),and (59) supra.
64. The Trial Court has failed on performing its official duties in accordance with the law . See Weldon v. State,247 Ga.App. 17,19(),543 S.E.2d 56 (2000),supra.
65. In a retrial after reversal on appeal the Trial Court is able and obligated to try the case only during periods when the court has jurisdiction of it's upon receiving the remittitur from the Appellate Court. Whereupon, On November 28, 2000, the Appellate Court's remanded Defendant Weldon's case to the Trial Court for a new trial on December 12, 2000, after properly filing the remittitur in the Lower Court by the Appellate's Clerk.
66. The legality of the defendant's Appeal and the remittitur's ordering a new trial are being ignored by the Trial Court's refusing to docket the case pursuant to O.C.G.A. 5-5-49 Subsection (a) & (b), Paragraph (57), supra.
DUTY OF TRIAL COURT, etc.
67. Pursuant to O.C.G.A. 24-10-60. Authorization of issuance of order requiring prisoner's delivery to serve as witness or criminal Defendant generally.
(A) when a prisoner confined in any State Prison, County Correctional Institution, or other Penal Institution under the jurisdiction of the Board of Offender Rehabilitation, other than a prisoner under a death sentence, is needed as a witness in any civil or criminal proceeding in any court of record in this State or when it is desired that such person stand trial on an indictment or accusation charging him with commission of a felony or misdemeanor, the judge of the court wherein the proceeding is pending is authorized to and shall issue an ex parte order, directed to the Board of Offender Rehabilitation, requiring his delivery to the sheriff of the county where the prisoner is desired as a witness or defendant. The sheriff or his deputies shall take custody of the prisoner on the date named in the order, safely keep him pending the proceeding, and shall return him to the original place of detention after his discharge by the Trial Judge.
68. The duty to bring the Defendant to trial following arrest and accusation rests upon the Court, the Prosecutor, and the Clerk of Court . See Klinetob v. State, 194 Ga.App. 52,389 S.E.2d 551 (1989). The state is able and obligated to try the case only during periods when the court has jurisdiction of it, Paragraph (62),& (65) supra.
THE TRIAL COURT REFUSAL TO REQUIRE AND SECURE DELIVERY OF PRISONER FOR RETRIAL .
69. The Clerk of the Lower Court has refused to furnish adequate notice of the remittitur upon the Department of Corrections. Thereby, putting the prison system on notice of an inmate's conviction has been reversed.
70. Upon receipt by the Trial Court of the remittitur from the Court of Appeals ruling ordering a new trial for the Defendant. The Lower Court of Court are automatically authorized to forward said copy's of remittitur to the Department of Corrections.
71. Once a remittitur is received by the Department of Corrections, thereupon, the prison officials then contact the Sentencing County's Sheriff's Department to pickup the inmate's for either a retrial or a dismissal of the charges.
72. Judge Johnston's office, having signed the remittitur, was aware the conviction was reversed and could have generated a Production Order to get Defendant Weldon to court. Paragraph (67) Supra.
73. Upon receiving the remittitur Judge Johnston's staff could have put Defendant Weldon on their trial calendars for a new trial in question.
74. The Defendant's case has never been rocketed nor has it been placed on the trial calendar for retrial.
75. Pursuant to O.C.G.A. 5-5-28 Docketing Case for New Trial. When a new trial has been granted by the court, the case shall be placed on the docket for trial as though no trial had been had,subject to the same rules for continuance provided in this code. See Underhill v. State,129 Ga.App 65,198 S.E.2d 703 (1973). One of the duties of Superior Court Clerks is to maintain a " docket of criminal cases, to be known as the dead docket, to which cases shall be transferred at the discretion of the presiding judge, and which shall only be called at his pleasure. " Code 24-2714 (7) O.C.G.A 15-6-61 (5)&(7) . We agree with the Appellate that the court's discretion may not be used in an unlawful manner, for instance,to keep an indictment hanging over the head of the Defendant merely to toll the running of the Statute of Limitations, Infra.
76. The remittitur serves the function of getting prisoner's out of the state system and back to the county jail for trial. However, the Trial Judge has the authority to send production orders to the corrections department for prisoners whose convictions have been reversed, Paragraph (67)&(72) Supra.
77. The Trial Judge should require reports from prosecutors, clerks ,and jailers as may be necessary to ensure that their responsibilities in bringing Defendant to trial are performed in a timely manner.
DEMAND FOR A FAST,FAIR AND SPEEDY TRIAL PURSUANT TO O.C.G.A. 17-7-170.
(a) Allows a Defendant to enter a demand for trial at the court term at which the indictment or accusation is filed or at the next succeeding regular court term thereafter.
(b) Further provides that "[i]f the person is not tried when the demand is made or at the next succeeding regular court terms there was juries impaneled and qualified to try him, he shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged in the indictment or accusation. "
78. Defendant Weldon's demanded a jury trial pursuant to O.C.G.A. 17-7-170. Said written demands were filed with the Clerk of Said Court and was served on the Prosecutor. A copy of said demands is attached to this Motion and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A",Exhibit "B",and Exhibit "C".
79. Said demand for trial (Exhibit A) being made on January 4, 2001,was within the December/January term of this court, and Exhibit "B" being made on April 25, 2001, within the April/May term of this court. And immediately thereafter, filed said Exhibit "C" being made on May 10, 2001, also within the April/May term of this court, the terms in which the remittitur was returned.
80. A trial calendar serves the convenience of and promote the orderly business of a court in disposing of its duties, Paragraph (73) and (74) Supra. See also Henry v. James,264 Ga.App. 527,449 S.E.2d 79 (1994). The Demand Clock for trying defendant resumed ticking when remittitur was filed in lower court on Defendant's interlocutory appeal, even though remittitur was not entered on minutes of Trial Court, O.C.G.A. 17-7-170. See Street v. State, 211 Ga.App. 230,438 S.E.2d 693 (1993). In the case at bar, the state was required to try appellants appellants pursuant to his demand for trial .
81. Defendant Weldon properly filed his demand for speedy trial upon this court district attorney office. See Majia v. State, 174 Ga.App. 432,330 S.E.2d 171 (1985),affix 254 Ga. 660,333 S.E.2d 834(1985). Quoting Castleberry v. State, 11 Ga.App. 757,76 S.E.74(1912). Thus,it is incumbent upon the clerk's office of the transferring court to forward a properly filed demand to that court which has newly acquired jurisdiction over the case. The Defendant has no further obligation to insure that the clerk of court performs his duty. See also Jeffries v. State, 140 Ga.App. 477,479 (1),231 S.E.2d 369 (1976), O'O'Neal v. State, 188 Ga.App 270,372 S.E.2d 833 (1988). The State's failure to receive notice of demand was properly attributable to Clerk of Court and not Defendant. Clerical errors may not affect a Defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial.
82. Defendant Weldon filed a timely demand for a speedy trial pursuant to O.C.G.A. 17-7-170,Supra.
"[I]f Such a person shall not be tried at the term when the demand is made, or within the next two succeeding regular terms thereof " he is entitled to be discharged. See Hensler v. State, 174 Ga.App. 609,332 S.E.2d 45 (1985). The court below found that the defendant made a timely demand for a jury trial pursuant to O.C.G.A. 17-7-170 during the January 1984, term of court and that juries were impaneled and qualified to try him at the terms his demand was filed and also during the next succeeding terms of the court (the March term). He was not tried, but was scheduled for trial on May 21, 1984, during the May term of court. See paragraphs (59),(78),and (79) Supra.
83. Defendant Weldon has been available for retrial while incarcerated at Dooly State Prison, under the custody and authorities of The Georgia Department of Corrections. Since the Court of Appeals of The State of Georgia render his decision in (November of 2000) Weldon v. State, Supra.
84. Defendant availability for trial, physical presence requirement onto O.C.G.A. 17-7-170 is satisfied if a defendant is available for trial whether physically present in court or not. See State v. Collins, 201 Ga.App. 500,411 S.E.2d 546 (1991). Defendant who was incarcerated on unrelated offense was nevertheless " available for trial, " so as to be entitled to discharge based on State's failure to bring case to trial within two terms following speedy trial demand, as Superior Court had authority to compel defendant's presence for trial.
Therefore, O.C.G.A. 17-7-170 was fully satisfied since Defendant Weldon was available for retrial. See also Paragraphs (57),and (67) Supra.
85. There were juries impaneled and qualified to try the Defendant through the end of the December 14, 2000, term of the Muscogee Superior Court. In this regard, refer to the affidavit of Remittitur which is attached to this Motion and incorporated here as " Exhibit D, "
86. On October 10, 2001 ,the Defendant was again " available for trial, " however, the Defendant was served with written notice from " The Center for Prisoners' Legal Assistance, Paralegal " at which time the Assistant District Attorney'sAttorney's George Lipscomb announced that the (Defendant) case would not be set for trial on October 10, 2001. See Paragraphs (83)and (84) Supra.
87. On or about March 1, 2002, Defendant's (CPLA) Paralegal's Counsel was apprised that (A court date has not yet been set) the trial of the Defendant's case was never actually set for retrial during the December, 2000, term through the July, term of court.
88. Prior to October 10, 2001, Defendant's (CPLA) Paralegal's Counsel was informed by The Georgia Department of Corrections Computer that the Defendant's conviction had not been reversed due to the Trial Judge, Clerk of Court, and District Attorney's Office (omitting) withholding the remittitur from The Georgia Department of Corrections. See Paragraphs (69) and (77) Supra.
89. The deliberate of withholding the remittitur was the result of improper conduct by the state. The District Attorney's knew that definitely it was highly unlikely that Defendant Weldon's case would be reached for retrial on December 14, 2000 ,term or the next succeeding regular term thereafter, February 5, 2001, without properly serving adequate notice of the remittitur upon The Georgia Department of Corrections. And accept for the willfulness withholding of the remittitur by the state to prevent the Defendant from pursuing his right to a Fast, Fair, and Speedy Trial. However, Defendant Weldon has been denied that opportunity due to the fact that there were trial calendars on February, April, and June, 2001 , that contained cases wherein the defendants were (In the county jail and the State Prison System) incarcerated and thus had to be brought to trial before cases were called wherein the Defendant was on bond. The Defendant's (CPLA) Paralegal's Counsel was further informed that this case was not being set to a trial calendar on March 1, 2002 .
90. There were juries impaneled and qualified to try the Defendant through the December 14, 2000 , term of the Muscogee Superior Court which ended on April 2, 2001. In this regard, refer to the affidavit of the Remittitur which is attached hereto as " Exhibit D. "
91. Thus, the Defendant respectfully shows that pursuant to O.C.G.A. Section 17-7-170 :
(a) he demanded a trial at the term when the ( remittitur ) indictment was ( received back from the Court of Appeals ) found
December 14, 2000; that
(b) said demand was served on the prosecutor ; that
(c) he was not tried when the demand was made; that
(d) he was not tried at the next succeeding regular term thereafter , February 5, 2001 ; that
(e) at both terms there were juries impaneled and qualified to try him.
WHEREFORE, Defendant having met all the requirements of O.C.G.A. Section 17-7-170, and said Statute being clearly mandatory and not subject construction, he respectfully requests that the court enter an order absolutely discharging and acquitting him of the offense charged in the indictment.
Respectfully Submitted
Ronnie Weldon
Defendant Pro Se.
Dated: 08/31/2002
Address
Ronnie Weldon
Dooly State Prison
P.O. Box 750
Unadilla,Ga.3Ga.31091.
See Brown v. State, No. A05A2230, (2006), Citing Weldon v. State,262 Ga.App. 782.
See also Letter to Mr. Scott Stallings ,Spokesman for GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.
Scott Stallings
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
#2 M.L.K Jr. Dr. S.E. - East Tower
Atlanta, Georgia, 30304
RE: Remittitur's in the case of Ronnie Weldon v. The State , Court Of Appeals Case No.A00A1696. Id at, 247 Ga.App. 17,19 (1),543 S.E.2d 56 (2000).
Dear Mr. Scott:
I am writing to you concerning a similar in which you commented about in the " Daily Report " on Monday April 8th, 2002 , " Clerk Error Delays Inmate's Murder Retrial Two Years. " Quote " Once that remittitur is received by the department, said corrections spokesman Scott Stallings, prison officials contact the Sentencing County's Sheriff's department to pick up the inmate. " Unquoted .
My conviction was reversed and remanded for new trial in the above case. However, since my case been reversed in November 28th, 2000 , I have filed three Motions ,Demand For A Fast ,Fair And Speedy Trial.
Pursuant To O.C.G.A 17-7-170. The Superior Court in Muscogee, County have refused to comply to the appeals court ruling ordering a new trial.
And plus the computer at The Georgia Department of Corrections are still showing and computing that my 1998 ,trial convictions are in facts valid. Because " that void convictions is being used to hold me in prison illegal. " The computer also show that my Tentative Parole Date 05/01/2007 ,and that my Maximum Release Date 05/29/2042.
Not only is that a blatant violations of my constitutional rights, but it is also against the Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia legal's
authority in this instance matter.
I ask that you please check and correct the Georgia Department of Corrections " Sentence Computation Form " Summary Report,
Dated 07/13/1998. And please delete that void conviction's from the department computer files. And I ask also that you please take whatever, appropriate step there is in the receiving of the remittitur and the appeals court ruling therein concerning the matter at hand. I have enclosed a certified copy's of the remittitur alone with the Appeals Court ruling ordering a new trial.
Thank you very much! ,for your time in this matter.
Respectfully Submitted this 20 day of June, 2002 .
Ronnie Weldon
Dooly State Prison
P.O. Box 750
Unadilla, Ga.3Ga.31091.
See The Fulton Daily Report, Monday April 8th ,2002, " Clerk Error Delays Inmate's Murder Retrial Two Years. "
By TRISHA RENAUD
Thanks to an evidentiary error in his 1996 murder trial. Dexter Michael Hill got his conviction reversed nearly two years ago . But, thanks to errors by Fulton Superior Court Clerks, he didn't leave the state prison system until last month.
For a year and 10 months after the Georgia Supreme Court reversed his conviction on May 1, 2000. Hill sat in Arrendale State Prison in Alto, instead of being returned to the Fulton County jail for either a retrial or a dismissal of the charges. He wrote the clerk's office twice asking why-- once in June 2000 and a second time a month later.
But there he sat,until late last month. That's when Fulton Superior Court Chief Judge Elizabeth E. Long said she learned about his situation and had Hill brought from Alto to her courtroom. Long was not the trial judge on Hill's case--tcase--the late judge William W. Daniel was--but the case is now assigned to her.
At a March 29 hearing, Long set a $150.000 bond for Hill, and prosecutors announced they intended to retry him for the 1996 shooting death of Ray Barlow. According to the Supreme Court opinion, when Hill was arrested he was in possession of the gun police said killed Barlow. Hill v. State, 272 Ga.App. 327 (2000).
Long in an interview, said she had never encountered anything quite like
See FULTON, Page 3
PRISONER TO CLERK: ' WHO HAS CUSTODY OVER ME? '
FULTON, from page 1
What happened to Hill. She said the responsibility lies with the clerk's office. Superior Court Clerk Juanita Hicks said a temporary clerk, who has left the office, is to blame for part of the errors. " We admit that we had an employee that did not follow procedure, " she said. " This to me is very, very serious, " But two of Hicks' top managers also insisted that some of the fault lies with Long's office.
This much is clear: Hicks' office never sent the Department of Corrections a copy of the remittitur it received from the Supreme Court, an action that puts the prison system on notice an inmate's conviction has been reversed.
Once that remittitur is received by the department, said corrections spokesman Scott Stallings, prison officials contact the Sentencing County's Sheriff's department to pick up the inmate.
Hill wrote Hicks' office more than a year after the reversal , asking. " [ W ] ho has custody over me? " His letter pointed out that his conviction was reversed, " yet I'm still being under the custody of the Department of Corrections. Why ? To my understanding, I am no-longer a convicted felony [sic]; therefore, should not be in a Georgia State Prison," Hill was right, But his June 5, 2001, letter apparently simply was stamped by the clclerk's office as filed. Nothing else was done.
Second Letter Sent
A second similar letter , dated July 15, 2001, was stamped and filed by Hicks' office Sept. 6 . No action was taken, according to court documents, until five months later when a letter dated Feb. 12, 2002 , was generated by Hicks' staff. The letter said Hill was being sent a copy of the remittitur and Long and the District Attorney's Office would get a copy of Hill's letter .
Long said she got that letter in late March, not in February. Hicks and three of her top managers said their office did make mistakes, beginning with failing to transmit the remittitur. Hicks said the clerk who processed the remittitur was a temporary employee who left some time ago.
One problem may have been that Hill had a co- defendant whose conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court the same day Hill's was reversed. Hicks said that the temporary clerk probably assumed both defendants' convictions had been affirmed and entered them on the computer that way.
Hill's case did not turn up last year on a list of what was supposed to be all pending murder cases generated from the clerk's computer database. Not did it turn up on a list of pending murder cases compiled by Fulton prosecutors.
Had Hill been returned to the Fulton jail, his name would have appeared on a prisoner list and his case probably would have gotten on track, according to Hicks. Court administrator regularly review list of prisoners at the Fulton jail to how long and why they are there.
Clerks 'Did Not Have...Experience '
Hicks said when Hill's first letter arrived last summer, the clerk who processed it didn't know what the letter
See FULTON, Page 4
CLERKS SAY JUDGE COULD HAVE HELPED .
FULTON, from page 3
meant or that action needed to be taken, and so simply filed it.
The clerk's office gets dozens of pieces of prisoner mail a week, and Phyllis Brown, chief deputy clerk in the court's division. Brown supervises the handling of prisoner mail and said she takes responsibility for the mishandling of Hill's letters. Hicks said that that summer, the clerks processing that mail " just did not have the experience... to take each piece of mail and know what to do with it."
The second letter, filed in September, eventually was answered, but not until February. " The dates speak for themselves, " Hicks said.
But her office insisted that Long's office got Hill's letter in February this year. " They didn't respond until six weeks later, " said Jeanette Rozier, chief deputy clerk for the office's criminal division.
Rozier said the judge's office and Hill's defense lawyer have some degree of responsibility for what happened. " Getting him to court is up to his attorney and the judge, " She said . " The system did fail him," Rozier said, adding that the judges, not the clerks, set the calendars .
Brown said Long's office, having signed the remittitur, was aware the conviction was reversed and could have generated a production
order to get Hill to court. As a former calendars clerk, she said, she had done so numerous times. Or, she added,upon receiving the remittitur the judge's staff could have put Hill on their calendars.
" The judges do have a part in this, " Brown said, adding that they are just " as much culpable in trying to get this guy back to court " as the clerk.
But Long said judges typically have don't send production orders to the corrections department for prisoners whose convictions have been reversed because the remittitur serves the function of getting them out of the state system and back to the county jail. At that point, she said, " He's no longer supposed to be in the state system at all."
And getting the prisoner back to Fulton is ultimately the clerk's job Long said. " Obviously several people could've corrected this problem had they known of it, she said. " But that responsibility is with the clerk's office. "
The lawyer who handled Hill's appeal, Rodney S. Zell , said Hill wrote him shortly after the Supreme Court ruled to thank him for getting the conviction reversed. Zell said he wrote back to tell Hill he would be brought back to Fulton and probably would get a public defender for his retrial. That's the last he heard, Zell said, until he got an urgent call last month from Long to come to court on Hill's behalf.
" I don't know if I bear any responsibility. " Zell said, adding that he were appointed solely to handle the appeals . " I thought I was off the case. "
Hicks said her office has taken steps to ensure that what happened to Hill doesn't reoccur , including instituting rule that managers get copies of remittitur's on all reversed convictions. And she said, a new computer program will track such situations. []
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What's something exciting your business offers? Say it here. ANATOMY OF THE COURT SYSTEM : 1. Arrest Warrants (Custody and disposition after arrest ) 2. Stop- And -Frisk (Report of a crime ) Search And Seizure (Who may apply for a search warrant ? ) probable cause required for issuance of search warrant - observation of " informer " not appearing before magistrate . PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE . FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE , RULE 16. (A) ( 1 ) ( B ). Rule 16. Discovery and Inspection ( A ) Disclosure of Evidence by the Government . ( 1 ) Information Subject to Disclosure . ( B ) Defendant's Prior Record . Upon request of the defendant , the government shall furnish to the defendant such copy of the defendant's prior criminal record , if any , as is within the possession ,custody , or control of the government , the existence of which is known ,or by the exercise of due diligence may become known , to the Attorney for the government . THE BRADY'S MOTION . MOTION FOR DISCOVERY. Defendant submits that there may be other items and matters of evidence , information , and data in existence that are not enumerated herein of which Defendant is unaware ; yet , Defendant now respectfully request and demand that he be afforded with any and all evidence and information , whether specifically delineated and list herein or not , that may be materially favorable to the Defendant . Brady -vs.- Maryland ,373 U.S. 83 (1963).
. The above Brady's Motion is based on a form of Bobby Lee Cook ,Sr . , of Summerville , Georgia . And the Motion To Reveal The Deal.
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Counsel IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MUSCOGEE COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA STATE OF GEORGIA VS RONNIE WELDON, Defendant. CASE NO. SU97CR2956-8 . NOTICE OF HEARING TO: PATRICK MOORE District Attorney's Office Fourth Floor Columbus, Georgia . You are hereby notified that defendant will bring the above Motion on for hearing before the Honorable Robert G. Johnston,III, at chambers on the 17th day of March, 1999 at 3:30 P.M. or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard. This 14th day of January, 1999. Respectfully Submitted, William J. Mason. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MUSCOGEE STATE OF GEORGIA STATE OF GEORGIA VS RONNIE WELDON, Defendant.CASE NO. SU97CR2956-8 AMENDED MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. Comes now the Defendant above named and makes this Amended Motion for New Trial to add the following grounds, and shows unto this honorable Court as follows:
2. The Court erred in admitting similar transaction evidence against the Defendant.
3. The Court erred in denying the Defendant's motion for a continuance in order to prepare for trial.
4. The Court erred in allowing the Defendant to be viewed by the jury when he was bound and gagged.
5. The Court erred in allowing the Defendant to proceed acting both as his own attorney and with appointed defense counsel.
6.The Court erred in admitting into evidence guns, scales,plastic bags, and razors found at the residence where the Defendant was arrested.
7. The Court erred in allowing the District Attorney to impeach defense witness without certified copies of prior convictions.
8. The Court erred in conducting portions of the trial outside the Defendant's presence.
9. The Court erred in admitting State's exhibit 18 into evidence over objection of the Defendant that he was not represented by counsel and because it contained a conviction for obstruction of a police officer.
10. The Court erred in admitting State's exhibit 19 into evidence over objection because the Defendant was not represented by counsel. 11. The Court erred in its charge to the jury concerning possession with the intent to distribute cocaine.
12. The Court erred in considering prior convictions of the Defendant because the Defendant was not afforded prior notice that the evidence would be used in aggravation of sentence.
13. The Defendant was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to meaningfully meet with him prior to trial to discuss defense strategy and failed to move to suppress the evidence seized at the premises where the Defendant was arrested. WHEREFORE, Defendant requests that his Motion for New Trial be granted.
This 14th day of January, 1999.
Respectfully Submitted,
William J. Mason
Attorney for Defendant
Georgia State Bar No. 475690
Post Office Box 1011
Columbus,Georgia 31901
Phone:706-322-8557
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MUSCOGEE COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
STATE OF GEORGIA
VS. INDICTMENT NO.
) SU-97-RC-2956
RONNIE WELDON,
Defendant. ) MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
)
Transcript of the proceedings before the HONORABLE
ROBERT G. JOHNSTON, III,Judge of the above - styled court commencing on March 17, 1999 at the Government Center, Columbus, Georgia.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL:
For the State: HONORABLE PATRICK MOORE
Assistant District Attorney
For the Defendant: HONORABLE WILLIAM MASON
Assistant Public Defender
JUDY K. MCNEILL
Official Court Reporter
Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit
1. THE COURT: Let the record reflect that Mr. Mason
2. has agreed that the Court has longer than three months
3. to rule on the Weldon case and the Finn case because of
4. the length of the trial and the number of issues
5. involved.
6. Mr. Mason, where is Mr. Weldon?
7. MR. MASON: Reidsville ,Georgia.
8. The Court: I miss him - - excuse me - - I miss his
9. Presence here. I believe the transcript, if read in
10. it's entirety, will reflect the difficulty that the
11. Court was faced with. The reason I say that is l,m
12 concerned about doing anything outside of Mr. Weldon's
13. Presence. I believe you indicated to me this morning
14. in the office that you had communicated with the
15. Sheriff, but somehow Mr. Weldon failed to get on the
16. bus from Reidsville; is that correct?
17. MR. MASON: I,m sure it's not from lack of trying .
18. There is a problem in the Department of Corrections
19. right now determining who is responsible for putting
20. people on the bus. We have three different names, but
21. the Sheriff Department has inspected the orders I
22. prepared that you signed, they're inspected the fax
23. letters to the Department of Corrections.
24. THE COURT: So I signed the order and sent it over
25. there and told them to bring Mr. Weldon herehere.
End of page 2.
1. MR. MASON: You signed the exact same thing that
2. produced Nelson Riley today.
3. THE COURT: ALL right.
4. MR. MASON: And through the negligence of the
5. Department of Corrections he was not sent to Rutledge
6. on the Monday bus and so he is not here.
7. THE COURT: Where was Mr. Riley.
8. MR. MASON: Somewhere else, I don't know.
9. THE COURT: ALL right. But anyway I cooperated
10. and signed the order to get Mr. Weldon here.
11. MR. MASON: You and I have done all we can do and
12. the Sheriff Department tells me it's the negligence of
13. the Department of Corrections. I've called and left
14. voice mail because you can't get a human on the phone
15. and we hope to have the problem corrected as quick as
16. we can. MR. Weldon is necessary for ground 13 of the
17. amended motion for new trial and ground 13 only. And
18. since we're here and have time scheduled, I would just
19. as soon go through the first 12 grounds without him and
20. his presence will be very minimal when he is here.
21. THE COURT: well, I'm not so sure about that based
22. on the transcript and trying Mr. Weldon. Mr. Weldon
23. was very emphatic about his position on certain things.
24. My only concern is that when we do get Mr. Weldon here
25. after the Department of Corrections has worked out
End of page 3.
1. their logistical problems, you know, what can we expect
2. from Mr. Weldon. I guess we don't know the answer to
3. that. We'll just have to wait and see.
4. All right, sir, proceed with the matters that you
5. don't think you need Mr. Weldon present for.
6. MR. MASON: Your Honor, the amended motion for new
7. trial filed in January of this year , ground two is that
8. the Court erred in admitting similar transaction
9. evevidence against the defendant . Specifically the Court
10. allowed evidence of a 1982 marijuana transaction during
11. a 1998 trial. It is our contention that a 16 year old
12. offense was outside the realm of reasonable similarity
13. and the record found on page five,six and seven of the
14. transcript does not support the necessary prerequisite
15. for the admission of similar transactions .
16. THE COURT: Okay.
17. MR. MASON: The next ground--
18. THE COURT: I believe he -- didn't he tell us that
19. MR. Frank. Martin was his lawyer on that one and that he
20. didn't want Mr. Craft , he wanted Frank Martin at that
21. point.
22. MR. MASON: I think part of his complaint with that
23. nobody represented him and Frank Martin represented the
24. police officer against him and that he was convicted by
25. an all white jury.
End of page 4.
1. THE COURT: That was in 1982 ?
2. MR . MASON: That's my recollection, Judge.
3. THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.
4. MR. MASON: Ground three is that the Court erred
5. in denying defendant's motion for a continuance in
6. order to prepare for trial. And I suppose that that
7. goes to ground 13 also, his troubles with his trial
8. lawyer, so probably the grounds for a continuance would
9. have to come from Mr. Weldon himself.
10. Ground four is the Court erred in allowing the
11. defendant to be viewed by the jury when he was bound
12. and gagged. This occurred during the trial of the
13. case. The Court, of course, is familiar. Page 38 of
14. the transcript indicates that during jury selection the
15. Court ordered that the defendant be gagged. Apparently
16. this occurred in the presence of the jury and he was
17. sitting here next to defense counsel with a gag in his
18. mouth. I wasn't here so I don't know the physical
19. make-up of the gag or restraints, but it is our
20. position that in the alternative the Court should have
21. removed Mr. Weldon and found that he had forfeited his
22. right to be present if his actions in front of the jury
23. was contemptuous of Court and that it was error to
24. bound and gag him and force him to remain in the
25. presence of the jury.
End of page 5.
1. THE COURT: It is my recollection that was his
2. choice. I mean , it wasn't his choice to be bound and
3. gagged , but he wanted to stay wouldn't be. quite.
4. And I didn't have any choice. But anyway, the
5. transcript speaks for itself
6. MR. MASON: Ground five is that the Court erred in
7. allowing the defendant to proceed acting both as his
8. ownown attorney and with appointed defense counsel. Your
9. Honor , the law is that you can either have a lawyer or
10. you can be your own lawyer, but you can't be both.
11. During the entire trial of this case Mr. Craft acted as
12. MR. Weldon's attorney and Mr. Weldon himself was
13. allowed to act as his own attorney. And in conjunction
14. with his testimony about not meeting his lawyer until
15. the day of the trial, we believe that the procedure
16. that the Court enacted, that is allowing everybody to
17. be their own attorney, was error and prejudiced the
18. trial of the case
19. THE COURT: Okay.
20. MR. MASON: Ground six, that the Court erred in
21. Admitting into evidence guns, scales, plastic bags and
22. razors found at the residence where the defendant was
23. arrested. The defendant was charged with sale of
24. cocaine and possession with intent to distribute
25. cocaine. The sale took place -- allegedly took place
End of page 6.
1. at a residence that was not where he was arrested. And
2. then the possession with intent to distribute was at
3. the place where he was arrested.
4. It is the defendant's position that the evidence
5. of guns and scales and knives and razors found in a
6. bedroom that he did not occupy and did not form the
7. place where the sale took place was irrelevant and
8. prejudicial to the defense.
9. The Court -- you may recall, they broke into the
10. grandmother's chifferobe and found rusty guns and other
11. paraphernalia and all that was admitted into evidence
12. And had no connection whatsoever to this defendant. It
13. is the defendant's position that allowing that evidence
14. before the jury when it had no connection to him or the
15. sale of cocaine count was prejudicial warrants a
16. new trial.
17. Ground seven is that the Court erred in allowing
18. the District Attorney to impeach defense witnesses
19. without certified copies of prior convictions. This
20. occurred on page 361 of the transcript where the
21. prosecutor at line 17 asked the defense witness, " Do
22. you or do you not have a criminal record?" Mr. Craft
23. objected and pointed out that the State did not have
24. any certified copies. The State's response was, line
25. 25, "Judge, neither did Mr. Craft and we allowed him to
End of page 7.
1. do it. " The Court then said, " I'm going to allow it ,
2. objection overruled " and the prosecutor was allowed to
3. ask the witness about 13 convictions for deposit
4. account fraud with no evidence of prior certified
5. copies.
6. It is the defendant's position that this
7. impeachment of the witness without certified
8. copies was improper.
9. Ground eight is that the Court erred in conducting
10. portions of the trial outside the defendant's presence.
11. THE COURT : I'd like to make a point here . It's
12. inconsistent for number four and number eight. I don't
13. know how I could conduct a trial -- at one point you
14. want me to take him out of the courtroom because he
15. wouldn't be quite. That's the objection in number
16. four. And then in number eight you put me in the
17. position of conducting a portion of the trial outside
18. the defendant's presence when the transcript clearly
19. reflects that the Court tried to be patient with Mr.
20. Weldon and gave him every opportunity to stay in this
21. courtroom. And at one point he simply stood up and
22. started to walk out. And as I recall, both deputies --
23. by that time we had about three or four deputies in the
24. courtroom -- all four of them stood up at one time as
25. MR. Weldon approached the side door to go out of the
End of page 8.
1. courtroom and , you know, I didn't know what to do with
2. him . I asked him if he wanted to stay and he said he
3. didn't so he got up and left. So it's inconsistent,
4. the two things, but go ahead and make your point.
5. MR. MASON : On page 350 of the transcript the
6. deputy informed the Court at line 13 that the defendant
7. wants to leave and the Court, without any inquiry of
8. the defendant, says at line 19, " All right, let him go
9. downstairs ". And then continued with the trial of the
10. case.
11. As the Court knows, a defendant has a fundamental
12. right to be present during all phases of the trial of
13. his case and any absence should be with a knowing and
14. voluntary waiver of presence.
15. THE COURT: If he behaves.
16. MR. MASON: This occurred at page 350 of the
17. transcript which was about 300 pages past the time he
18. had to be bound and gagged. Apparently things were
19. getting along better with the Court.
20. THE COURT: I invite the Court of Appeals to look
21. at the transcript in those 300 pages and see how many
22. times Mr. Weldon asked me questions and how many times
23. I tried to answer him , how many times I did everything
24. that I could for Mr. Weldon. If you think the
25. transcript is silent for 300 pages, I invite the
End of page 9.
1. tribune that is above me to read the entire transcript.
2. Go ahead.
3. MR. MASON: Ground number nine is that the Court
4. erred in admitting State's exhibit State's exhibit 18 into evidence
5. over objection of the defendant that he was not
6. represented by counsel and because it contained a
7. conviction for obstruction of a police officer.
8. Exhibit 9 -- I'm sorry -- exhibit 18 was the
9. aforementioned 1982 conviction of Mr. Weldon for
10. selling marijuana and obstruction of an officer. The
11. initial complaint is that part of the conviction for
12. obstruction of a police officer was admitted into
13. evidence without any proffer by the state or notice to
14. the defendant that they intended to introduce the
15. obstruction of a police officer as a similar
16. transaction to the obstruction of a police officer that
17. he was on trial for in front of you. That was placed
18. before the jury without any limitation , without a
19. ruling from the Court that it was a similar obstruction
20. and without any notice to the defendant that it was
21. placed before them .
22. In adaddition, State's Exhibit 18 is a copy of an
23. indictment and under the record I have it is a copy of
24. a sentence from Judge Land. There is no evidence that
25. the defendant was represented by counsel, nor that he
End of page 10.
1. entered the plea voluntarily and knowledgeably . And
2. that was the objection stated by counsel to that
3. particular conviction coming before the jury.
4. THE COURT : Okay.
5. MR. MASON: Ground 10 is that the Court erred in
6. admitting State's exhibit 19 into evidence for the same
7. objection. State's Exhibit 19 purports to be a 1985
8. conviction of Ronnie Weldon for possession of a
9. controlled substance and possession of marijuana. It
10. contains an indictment. It contains a sentencing page
11. signed by Judge McCombs and signed by the defendant.
12. It dose not indicate anywhere on it that he was
13. represented by counsel or that he entered this plea
14. freely and voluntarily. That was the objection and 19
15. was entered into evidence over that objection.
16. Ground 11 is that the Court erred in its charge to
17. the jury concerning possession with intent to
18. distribute cocaine. Page 401 of the transcript there
19. was some confusion about the Court's charge to the
20. jury. It shows an unreported bench conference between
21. you and the prosecutor and another discussion in front
22. of the jury. The transcript says what it says. Would
23. you like me to give it to the Court to read or would
24. you like me to read into the record ?
25. THE COURT: Whatever you want to do.
End of page 11.
1. MR. MASON: BeBeginning on line three of page 400
2. the Court charges the jury, "All right, let's deal with
3. the three crimes that are charged here in this
4. indictment. The first count is violations of the
5. Controlled Substances Act, possession of it , I believe.
6. The indictment always tries to track the language of
7. the law, not exactly but within reason and without
8. varying too much from the language of the law.
9. First of all, let's define controlled substance
10. and talk about possession and selling and so forth.
11. The offense charged in this indictment is a violation
12. of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act that provides
13. in part as follows: It shall be unlawful for any
14. person to manumanufacture, possess or have control of,
15. sell , prescribe, possess with intent to distribute,
16. administer or dispense any controlled substance except
18. that cocaine is a controlled substance within the
19.meaning of this act " .
20. The Court then goes on to have a paragraph about
21. physicians and veterinarians being allowed to prescribe
22. them . At this point Mr. Moore interrupts and the Court
23. resumes at page 401, line 10 , " What they showed me was ,
24. I read you all of the definition of controlled
25. substance. He's not charged with manufacturing it. I
End of page 12.
1. didn't -- I thought y'all could figure that out. He's
2. charged with selling it and possessing it . So it's
3. wrong or it's reversible, it is not correct for me to
4. say that he is charged with manufacturing and so forth.
5. The indictment doesn't say that. So if you find him
6. guilty, you have to find him guilty of possessing it
7. and selling it" .
8. Mr. Moore then interrupts again and after a
9. discussion the Court at line 25 charges the jury,
10. " Excuse me, possession with intent. I read you that
11. anyway. That's part of the indictment " .
12. It is the defendant's position that the Court's
13. charge taken as a whole did not delineate and give the
14. jury the factors needed for count one and count two of
15. the indictment ; that is count one being sale of a
16. Controlled substance on a specific date, and count two
17. possession with intent to distribute a controlled
18. substance on a separate date.
19. Count 12 of the amended motion for new trial is
20. that the Court erred in considering a prior conviction
21. of the defendant because the defendant was not afforded
22. prior notice that the evidence would be used in
23. aggravation of sentence. This occurred at page 414 of
24. the indictment (SIC) . My review of the file provided
25. by the public defender's office did not have any notice
End of page 13.
1. of aggravation of sentence. Mr . Craft objected at line
2. two, page 414 to the introduction of prior convictions.
3. At page 413, line 18, the State retendered for the
4. purpose of sentencing the three prior drug convictions
5. they had entered as similar transactions and
6. recommended the maximum and that it be served
7. consconsecutive because of the prior record of the
8. defendant.
9. Those are the grounds enumerated by the defendant.
10. except for ground 13 which is ineffective assistance of
11. counsel which we will make proof of when Mr. Weldon is
12. available.
13. THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Moore.
14. Mr. Moore: Yes, sir. Judge, most of what I have
15. to say I'll just stand on the transcript, but there's
16. some things in here that were so misstated by Mr. Mason
17. that I feel the Court needs to be aware of them for
18. future motions for new trials so you know that when Mr.
19. Mason makes a few of these comments, you need to read a
20. little bit further.
21. The 1982 marijuana transaction, Mr. Mason
22. neglected to tell you was for selling marijuana out of
23. the exact same house where the defendant was caught
24. selling cocaine. So, I mean , almost identical cases,
25. the only thing different was the drug. The passage of
End of page 14.
1. time goes to the admissibility -- goes to the weight of
2. the evidence and not the admissibility in most
3. circumstances. That was on , I think, count one or two
4. of the motion for new trial.
5. Number six where the defense attorney objects to.
6. the introduction of guns, scales, razors and bags
7. regarding the possession with intent count, I just -- I
8. don't know how a reasonably intelligent person could
9. feel that those things were irrelevant to a possespossession
10. with intent to distribute. The testimony surrounding
11. the introduction of those pieces of evidence was that
12. these are things that drug dealers use to distribute
13. and package drugs.
14. Again, on number seven, the reason that I gave for
15. not using a certified copy of the conviction was
16. incomplete. Mr. Mason said -- stated half of a
17. sentence and there was a whole bunch of other stuff
18. around that. The reason why I didn't have a certified
19. copy is because the witness wasn't on the witness list.
20. It was a surprise witness by the defendant and that was
21. a concession that the Court made in order to , you know ,
22. go ahead and let that witness testify but I would be
23. given the leniency of using a GCIC instead of a
24. certified copy. So that was just the complete reason .
25. Trial outside the defendant's presence. This is
End of page 15.
1. important so that there is no confusion. The defendant
2. got up on his own and walked out and , you know , there
3. was an attempt made to get him back in here and he
4. affirmatively refused to come back into the courtroom
5. during the trial. So there is no way that could ever
6. be considered error and it's -- it's just kind of, I
7. don't know , unreasonable, misleading, I don't know, to
8. try to say that that's error, it upsets me.
9. THE COURT: When this case is reviewed by the
10. Court of Appeals, I ask them respectfully to look at
11. the entire transcript of this trial from the beginning
12. to end and consider the totality of the circumstances
13. and consider the difficulty that the Court was having
14. with the conduct of the defendant in this case. That
15. was my point about one of Mr. Mason's two points, it's
16. inconsistent to say that he should have been in the
17. courtroom but not gagged and then that I couldn't try
18. the case outside his presence when I could not get him
19. to be quiet. Absolutely could not get him to be quiet
20. and the transcript reflects that.
21. I want the Court of Appeals -- I admit to them on
22. the record that when I decide this case -- and I'm
23. going to look at it very carefully, that's why I asked
24. for more than 90 days or three months and the defense
25. counsel agreed to it -- I admit to them that there are
End of page 16.
1. some errors in this case, but I handled it the best way
2. I knew how to handle it under all circumstances that
3. were before me at this time. I had a defendant who was
4. yelling at me, who was yelling in front of the jury,
5. who had a Daniel that was outdated and he continued to
6. cite it to me,he continued to pound on it,he
7. continued to say this , that and the other. At one
8. point he made a chalchallenge to the prosecutor in the case
9. because of something about a habeas corpus that Mr.
10. Moore had handled. I don't recall that , but it was
11. totally frivolous. There wasn't anything else I could
12. do. I didn't have any choice but to bind and gag him.
13. And I tried to follow the rules of law and give the man
14. a fair trial.
15. The real issue in the case is whether or not Mr.
16. Craft had an opportunity to talk to him and whether his
17. feeling that he didn't have adequate counsel is
18. justified or not. That's the real issue in the case
19. because if the Court of Appeals looks at his conduct
20. during the trial of this case, it would be impossible
21. for any trial judge to hold a court under law and order
22. and decorum and maintain what a courtroom is supposed
23. to be, not a rigid, military exercise but a courtroom
24. where one person speaks at one time, that's the
25. prosecutor and the defense lawyer speaks and the Court
End of page 17.
1. listens and tries to make the best decision it can .
2. But in this instance the Court was being interrupted by
3. the defendant after I asked him to be quiet several
4. times . I warned him. I said, now we can do this two
5. ways. You can either be quiet and behave and get a
6. fair trial, or, you know, I'm going to have to make you
7. be quiet . So I did the only thing I could do . So I --
8. I didn't like doing it , it wasn't a lot of fun , I
9. wasn't proud of it , but it was all I could do. And I
10. didn't know what else to do.
11. I made a determination that he had talked with the
12. public defender, that the public defender was his
13. lawyer, that he had given the public defender enough
14. information to defend him , that he had been advised by
15. the public defender of what was going on. He just came
16. up to this courtroom that morning and he decided he
17. wasn't going to go to trial, it didn't make any
18. difference whether I gave him a lawyer, if I gave him
19. F. Lee Bailey or the former mayor of Columbus, Frank
20. Martin, who he claimed defended him in 1982, and said
21. that he was convicted because he was in front of an
22. all - white jury. Mr. Martin's role as a criminal
23. defense lawyer is outstanding. If I had Frank Martin
24. here that morning to represent him, he would not have
25. accepted him. He didn't want anybody as his lawyer.
End of page 18.
1. He just flat out didn't want to go to trial and he was
2. going to do anything in his power to disrupt this
3. courtroom and decide that he wasn't going to go to
4. trial no matter what I did , whether I was the judge or
5. anybody else was the judge.
6. And if they are going to bring race -- if he's
7. going to bring it into the case , I want -- I don't
8. remember the racial make - up of the jury , but I know
9. that --
10. Mr. Moore, do you know how many black people were
11. on the jury ?
12. MR. MOORE: in this last case ?
13. THE COURT: Yeah, in the Weldon case.
14. MR. MOORE: I could look it up , Judge . I probably
15. have it down in my office with all my voir dire stuff ,
16. but I don't have it off the top of my head.
17. THE COURT: Well , my recollection was that it was
18. at least six black people on the jury which would make
19. it 50 - 50 , which is about what the racial make - up is in
20. Muscogee County now , it's right at 51-49 , 54-47 ,
21. something like that . So I just -- I want it clear that
22. I didn't know what else to do with Mr. Weldon and if
23. the Court of Appeals wants me to give him another
24. trial, I'll give him one , but I'm going to have to look
25. at everything and decide whether I'm going to give him
End of page 19.
1. one or not .
2. Are there any other points on Mr. Mason's list of
3. errors that you want to address ?
4. MR. MOORE : Everything else, like I said, I'll
5. stand on the transcript, but another thing that is
6. really glaring that needs to be clarified . On his
7. final one where he objected to sentencing , entering the
8. three felonies because they had no notice . On page
9. nine of the transcript it clearly states that the
10. defendant was notified prior to trial that those were
11. going to come in and he was going to be punished as a
12. recidivist . So number 12 is just frivolous and if the
13. Court would take note of that.
14. That's all I have , Your Honor.
15. THE COURT : All right. I do think that whatever
16. it takes , Mr. Mason, we need to get Mr. Weldon back
17. here so he can be heard from because it's important, at
18. least I'll give him the credit that he was insistent
19. upon being heard from and he had the right to be heard
20. from. And there were some few points of law that he
21. made to the Court that I think he was correct on and I
22. believe the transcript reflects that. So I tried to
23. rule when I thought he was correct.
24. I'll need some time on this one to look at
25. everything. I note that there were 12 errors that you
End of page 20.
1. cited me that I made a mistake and 13 involves him and
2. we'll just have to wait until we can get Mr. Weldon
3. back from the penal system to hear from him.
4.Lines 4 - 5 blank .
6. ( END OF PROCEEDINGS )
7. Lines 7 - 25 blank.
End of page 21.
1. STATE OF GEORGIA
2. COUNTY OF MUSCOGEE
3.
4. CERTIFICATE
5. The foregoing pages were taken before me as an Official
6. Court Reporter for the ChattaChattahoochee Judicial Circuit and
7.reduced to typewriting under my direction and supervision,
8. And I certify that it is a true and correct transcript to
9. the best of my ability of the proceedings.
10. This 11th day of April, 1999.
11. Judy MCNEILL
13. JUDY K. MCNEILL
14. OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
15 NO. B - 1611
End of page 22.
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MUSCOGEE COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
STATE OF GEORGIA INDICTMENT NO .
VS. SU - 97 - CR - 002956
RONNIE WELDON,
Defendant
MOTION
Transcript of the proceedings before the HONORABLE
ROBERT G . JOHNSON, III, Judge of the above - styled court, commencing on May 24, 1999 , at the Government Center, Columbus, Georgia.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL :
FOR the State: HONORABLE ALONZA WHITAKER
Assistant District Attorney
For the Defendant: HONORABLE WILLIAM MASON
Attorney at Law
Also Present: HONORABLE STEVE CRAFT
Public Defender
SHARON D. DILLESHAW
Official Court Reporter
Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit
End of page 1.
1. THEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDING WERE HAD AND
2. TAKEN:
3. THE COURT: ALL right , Mr. Mason , make your
4. points .
5. MR. MASON: Your Honor , this is a continuation of
6. a hearing that was held on March the 17th , I believe in
7. this Court . The issues reserved for this hearing were
8. raised by ground 13 of the Amended Motion for New
9. Trial. Mr. Weldon was not brought back to the county
10. by the Department of Corrections so it had to be
11. postponed. Trial counsel , Mr .Craft - -
12. THE COURT: Mr . Weldon is present, the record will
13. note,in this courtroom and has been brought back .
14. MR. MASON:Yes, sir. Also necessary in this
15. hearing is trial counsel, Mr. Craft, I just notified
16. your office , they said they would call him and tell him
17. to get over here as quick as he can.
18. But, we can begin with the testimony of Mr . Weldon
19. And present that and we have a couple of exhibits to
20. tender when Mr . Craft gets here and that will be all
21. that this hearing is for Judge.
22. THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. Have Mr . Weldon say what
23. he's got to say.
24. ( Whereupon , the defendant was sworn )
25. THE DEFENDANT: I`LL give my ultimatum , yes, I
End of page 2.
1. do.
2. THE COURT : Sir ? I'm sorry , I didn't understand.
3. THE DEFENDANT : I said , I give my ultimatum,
4. I do.
5. THE COURT : ALL RIGHT.
6. MR . MASON: Stipulating the history of the case .
7. Your Honor, Mr. Weldon, you went to trial back in - -
8. THE DEFENDANT: April 16th .
9. MR . MASON: April the 16th of 1998, is that right ?
10. THE DEFENDANT: Yes , sir .
11. MR . MASON: Now ,Mr . Steve Craft was appointed by
12. the Court to represent you at that trial?
13. THE DEFENDANT : Yes , sir .
14. MR . MASON : And how many times did Mr. Craft come
15. to visit you at the Muscogee County Jail prior to
16. trial ?
17 . THE DEFENDANT: He never - - I never seen him until
18. the day of the trial .
19. MR . MASON : What day were you arrested ?
20. THE DEFENDANT : I think May the 30th , 1997.
21. MR. MASON : So , from May of ' 97 through your trial
22. date in April ' 98, Mr. Craft never came and talked to
23. you about Your case , is that right ?
24. THE DEFENDANT : Yes , sir.
25. MR. MASON : Did you have some things that you
End of page 3 .
1. needed to discuss with him ?
2. THE DEFENDANT : I needed to inform him about I had
3. a leg monitor on , I was on house arrest at the time the
4. drug sale case took place . That would have proved that
5. I didn't sell the drugs .
6. MR. MASON : Okay . So you were charged with one
7. count of sale of cocaine on one date and then on the
8. date of Your arrest , you were charged with possession
9. with intent to distribute , is that right ?
10. THE DEFENDANT : Yes , sir .
11. MR. MASON : And on the sell case , you were wearing
12. an ankle monitor ?
13. THE DEFENDANT : Yes , sir .
14. MR. MASON : Is that because you were on parole for
15. another offense ?
16. THE DEFENDANT : Because I had just got out of
17. prison .
18. MR . MASON : Okay . And tell the Court very briefly
19. how that ankle monitor works .
20. THE DEFENDANT : They gave me 12 hours to go to
21. work , 7:00 in
